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Public Health, Regulation and the Nanny State Fallacy
Janet Hoek, Centre for Translational Research into Chronic Disease, University of Otago

Abstract
Regulations designed to prevent third parties from harming individuals have achieved
widespread acceptance, yet proposals to limit the harm individuals might cause to themselves
have generated considerable debate. While some argue that moral and economic imperatives
require state intervention, others claim individuals’ choices should not be constrained, no
matter how harmful these might prove to be. Opponents of regulation regularly describe state
interventions to promote public health as “nanny state”, and accuse the government of trying
to assume a decision-making role they argue belongs with individuals. These arguments are
explored using proposals to limit food marketing. Our analysis suggests rejection of
government intervention by describing this as “nanny statist” is illogical and avoids much
needed rational debate over the options that might best promote public health objectives.

Introduction
Governments have intervened to promote public health objectives for many centuries;
Jochelson (2006) noted regulations have promoted factory safety and water quality, mandated
seatbelt wearing, and specified blood alcohol levels (see also Lang and Rayner, 2003). These
interventions have protected individuals from the actions of others and, while now generally
accepted, often provoked intense discussion when first proposed (Baggott, 2005). However,
where interventions have sought to promote public health objectives by protecting individuals
from the harmful consequences of their own actions, debate has proved even more intense.
Jochelson (2006) described the different philosophies that governments bring to public health
decisions. She suggested an interventionist approach seeks to reduce the social inequities that
contribute to health disparities, thereby promoting public health. Thus she argues that:
“Legislation brings about change that individuals on their own cannot, and sets new
standards for the public good” (p. 1149). Her argument reflects the view that, since
individuals’ choices are constrained by their environment, changes to this are required before
people may exercise full and free choices. She proposes that these changes are most
efficiently brought about via government regulation. As McKee and Raine (2005) noted, this
approach follows the Marxist view, which suggests that although people make their own
history, this is shaped less by their free will than it is by their circumstances.
However, libertarians oppose these views; they promote individual freedom and reject
attempts to constrain this as demeaning. For example, Connelly (1999) argued that state
intervention reduces the role played by individuals, to the extent that they become “largely
just a pawn in a societal game” where their “resilience, ingenuity, and scope for action” (p.
59) is undervalued. Views such as these follow John Stuart Mill’s argument that individuals
have a right to perform actions that may result in harm, even though others, including the
state, have to take responsibility for the consequences and so may wish to intervene to reduce
or stop the behaviour.

These competing philosophies are evident in many public health debates and have recently
re-emerged as business groups, health researchers and politicians explore how to reduce the
increasing proportion of children and adults classified as overweight or obese. Groups
representing varied positions on the political spectrum have not disputed medical evidence
that obesity represents a serious public health problem (Yach et al, 2004); however, there is
no consensus over how the consequences of obesity might be averted.
This discussion raises important questions about the role the state should play in creating
environments that support healthy behaviour. The following section analyses interventions
open to government and reviews the efficacy of these, before evaluating claims made in this
debate.

The Intervention Spectrum
Limitations of Education
Rothschild (1999) argued that interventions to promote behaviour change fell into three
categories: “carrots, sticks and promises”. He described education campaigns, which aim to
fill knowledge gaps in the belief that enhanced knowledge will translate into behaviour
change, as “promises”. He noted that education is a weak measure, particularly when
employed in environments that actively promote, support and reinforce risk behaviours.
The limitations of purely educative approaches are evident in several public health fields
where awareness of a desired behaviour is much greater than adoption of that behaviour. For
example, recent estimates of awareness of “5+” messages are twice the proportion of
individuals who claim to act on this message (and this estimate is likely to be inflated by
social desirability error). Findings such as these led Jochelson (2006) to state that education
could “have only some impact on knowledge and attitudes, and little impact on behaviour”
(p.1153). Similarly, Swinburn (2006) epitomised the failure of communication campaigns
when he argued that “obesity is not a knowledge deficit problem.” Furthermore, as Joffe and
Mindell (2004) pointed out, education campaigns reinforce the wealthy and better educated,
who are already likely to practise the promoted behaviour. Education alone, they warned,
may have the unintended effect of exacerbating existing health inequalities (Durante, 2007).
Perhaps more fundamentally, attempts to educate consumers to make healthier choices
implicitly accept that argument that individuals are responsible for their own actions,
irrespective of the context in which they perform these. Rayner (2007) argues this approach
is illogical, since the major determinants of health “are increasingly located at the national
and global levels” (p.453). Providing information may thus improve knowledge, but will
have little or no effect on behaviour if the environmental constraints that shape this remain
unchanged (Nestle, 2006). Thus adoption of the least intrusive tool requires an explicit
recognition that this is also likely to be the least effective option, a point we return to later.
The Social Marketing Alternative
In response to this evidence, social marketing, which provides incentives and rewards that
promote behaviour change, has increased in popularity. Referred to by Rothschild as
“carrots’, social marketing differs from education because it recognises the importance of
exchange (McDermott et al, 2005). Social marketers offer a benefit that will follow adoption

of the promoted behaviour; this recognises that, for consumers to forgo the outcomes they
achieve from a risk behaviour, they must receive an equivalent (or superior) benefit.
McDermott et al (2005) criticised many social marketing programmes for failing to provide a
clear benefit or exchange and suggested many are no more than social advertising campaigns.
This criticism highlights the challenge social marketers face in competing effectively with
commercial enterprises, whose ability to provide wide-ranging, highly sought-after and
eminently reinforcing benefits is difficult to counter (Salinsky, 2006).
Like education initiatives, social marketing campaigns (whether exchange-oriented or social
advertising) are typically launched into a hostile environment where they are a tiny voice that
struggles to be heard above the cacophonous commercial babble. Given this context, their
opportunity to change the environment is limited, while their ability to exert a positive
influence on behaviour is even smaller. Recognition of these limits, particularly when used
to change well-established behaviours, led Lang and Raynor (2007) to warn that social
marketing is not “a panacea for inaction elsewhere in the policy world” (p.169).
The Logic of Regulation
In these situations, where the environment strongly pre-disposes risk behaviour, Rothschild
recommends use of a “stick”, or regulatory intervention, since this is the most powerful and
rapid means of changing the factors that exert the strongest influence on behaviour (see also
Weiss and Smith, 2004). As many public health researchers have noted, regulations have
modified environments (smokefree laws), imposed limits on behaviour (permissible blood
alcohol levels for driving), restricted access to products (cold medications able to be
“cooked” into pseudoephidrine), and required the adoption of new behaviours (mandatory use
of cycle helmets) (Baron, 2006). Each of these examples illustrates a change that reduced
third party risk to individuals; however, initiatives to reduce risks that individuals may pose
to themselves have led some politicians and those whose commercial interests are threatened,
to describe regulatory proposals as “nanny statist”.
As Pannetta et al (2003) noted, merely describing an argument cannot be regarded as
equivalent to advancing a counter-argument, since no alternative proposition is put forward.
According to their logic, labelling arguments as “nanny statist” is form of ad hominem attack
that aims not to expose the limitations of a position, but to discredit the individual advancing
that argument. Jochelson (2006) recognised and warned against this strategy, which she
argued is the antithesis of reasoned debate: “Dismissing government intervention as nannystatist limits debate about the possible benefits of state intervention” (p. 1151).
From a more formal logical perspective, “nanny state” allegations go beyond ad hominem as
some claims create straw people that deflect attention away from public health problems and
affected individuals. “Nanny state” claims also often rely on slippery slope reasoning where
proposed regulatory interventions are seen as the beginning of a series of increasingly
intrusive measures, as Roy (2003) illustrates. Furthermore, those labelling ideas as “nanny
statist” may posit a false dichotomy where governments either adopt a laissez faire position
or intervene; this approach fails to recognise that intervention may be the means through
which individual freedom of choice could be achieved. Johnson (2003) explicitly recognised
this paradox when she argued that obesity should be recognised as a public health problem,
rather than a question of individual freedoms or responsibilities (p.70).

Jochelson’s concerns that these tactics would limit debate were realised during the 2007 NZ
Parliamentary Inquiry into Obesity and Types 2 Diabetes, where derision by definition was a
recurring theme. The same tactic has re-emerged in submissions on the Public Health Bill
which, if passed in its current form, would contain provisions that enabled the Director
General of Health to regulate in situations where she or he believed voluntary standards or
codes of practice provided insufficient public health protection. In the remainder of this
paper, we analyse assertions made by politicians, the media and business lobby groups, and
critically evaluate the evidence base and logical status of these.

The Nanny State Allegations
Right wing politicians criticised proposals to limit food marketing to children when these
were first mooted as a potential response to the growing problem of youth obesity. Wilson
(2003), for example, claimed that “Banning fast food advertising would be another attack on
freedom of speech and more state nannying and should be rejected” and suggested that the
right to advertise was a “fundamental right”. Roy (2003) intimated that restrictions on food
advertising would be the first step to a state where “Labour [government party] makes all our
lifestyle decision – such as what we wear and how we cut our hair”. Editorial writers
expanded on this theme, describing regulation as an “old-style belief” that “social problems
can be solved by Nanny State throwing another regulation at them” (The Press, 2003) and
highlighting the “spectre of the food police delving into the supermarket trolleys of ordinary
New Zealanders”. Similarly, columnists for business magazines sympathised with marketers
“battling a Nanny State mentality” (Agee, 2007, p.6).
After politicians and the media adopted the term “nanny state”, business advocacy groups
used it to disparage initiatives they believed ran counter to their interests. Irwin, executive
director of an advertisers’ lobby group, reportedly “frames the debate [over food advertising
restrictions] as one of individual freedom versus nanny state” and told a public health
conference that “draconian intervention which [sic] diminishes the rights and responsibilities
of the individual to make choices…is undesirable” (The New Zealand Herald, 2005). Irwin
dismissed individuals as well as “the debate” using the same tactic and criticised a senior
academic who challenged his position as someone seeking a ‘nanny state in New Zealand”
(Wilson, 2006; Manawatu Standard, 2006).
As new legislation that would facilitate regulation to promote public health has moved
through the parliamentary process, those favouring self-regulation and free market
philosophies have also used “nanny state” allegations to undermine the Bill. For example,
during Parliamentary question time, Ryall (2008) asked the Minister of Health “Why is it [the
Labour Government] proposing wide regulation powers that would enable the nanny State to
ban all food and alcohol sponsorship of sports teams, to tell all restaurants what food they
can serve and to ban fish and chips after 8pm at night?”. In a media release, he stated that
the Bill was “nanny state gone too far” and claimed “this is Helen Clark [Prime Minister}
getting into your pantry” (Oliver, 2008). Media representatives have expressed concerns to
MPs that they would be prevented from “reporting on food, alcohol, and other societal
issues” (Ryall, 2008b) and have used their own columns to describe regulatory provisions in
the bill as “high-handed nanny state activity” (Waikato Times, 2008). Industry groups have
also argued that the bill has “serious implications for commerce, freedom of speech [and]
removal of consumer choice” (Houlahan, 2008).

Public health advocates have responded to “nanny state” allegations; Keating and Sturgiss
(2008) challenged business groups’ argument that education is more effective than regulation
and drew attention to the conflict of interest that exists when these groups advocate
mechanisms that protect their needs above public health, community and national needs.
Keating and Sturgiss also called on the government to demonstrate courage in the face of
name calling (Hill, 2007; Tahana, 2008) and re-defined the free-market case to expose the
food industry’s extensive efforts to influence consumers’ behaviour. Thus, Sturgiss (2008)
argued “This isn’t about a Nanny state, this is about stopping the junk food industry being in
charge of the nursery”. These arguments have won support from some media commentators,
with one recently claiming that “nanny state” descriptions “avoid the issue” and suggesting
that “The fewer phrases like ‘nanny state’… that pepper those conversations, the better”
(Herald on Sunday, 2008; Nelson Daily Mail, 2007).
Evidential Ironies
Opponents of regulation promoting public health have demanded evidence that regulation
would reduce obesity levels, even though strong evidence documenting the effect of food
marketing on children’s behaviour exists (Stead et al, 2007). Causal evidence is difficult to
present, since control-group experiments are ethically difficult and logistically impossible to
conduct. The standards opponents of regulation call for differ from those they apply to
education proposals and self-regulatory responses to obesity, which appear to take no account
of the extensive public health research that has been conducted. For example, Land and
Rayner (2003) warned against: “reliance on the private sector (consumerism) to perform in
the public interest, when history shows the opposite” (p. 74; see also Knai et al 2005).
Jochelson concluded that “Education programmes are ineffective on their own” (p. 1153),
though she suggested these could be helpful if used in conjunction with strong regulatory
measures.
Similar questions have been raised about the effectiveness of self-regulation. In her review
of self-regulatory models, Hawkes (2005) concluded that self-regulation could prevent
deceptive advertising, but differentiated this from what she described as the “very, very
different aim of preventing the effects of advertising on children’s diets” (p.380). She found
that the low number of complaints about food advertising did not imply widespread
satisfaction with self-regulation, but instead reflected the fact that the complaints system is
“framed around the acute effects of deceptive and offensive advertisements, not the chronic
effects of… promotions for less than health foods” (p. 380). Hawkes also questioned whether
self-regulation has the power to promote healthier choices when these are incompatible with
the food industry’s commercial objectives and concluded that “statutory powers” are
required to create an environment conducive to healthier behaviour (see also Kelly, 2005;
Nestle, 2006).

Conclusions
Reliance on the term “nanny state” to discredit regulatory proposals needs to be exposed as
lacking both logic and credibility. Similarly, discrepancies in the standards of evidence
required of regulatory and education proposals highlight the need for greater consistency in
the evaluation of policy options. Models of regulatory intervention merit more widespread
discussion, since these seem likely to promote individual autonomy within enabling
environments. Jochelson (2006) favoured the notion of “stewardship”, which she argued had

been advanced by the WHO as “the very essence of good government´ (p.1154). This idea is
similar to Cottram’s (2005) “intelligent government”, and Joffe and Mindell’s (2004) “canny
government”, where the state is “clever, prudent, capable and shrewd” (p.967. Wider debate
of these models might help ensure decisions made to counter obesity are based on evidence
not invective, and logic rather than derision.
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